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‘Feelings of vivid fellowship’: Vernon Lee and Clementina Anstruther-Thomson’s Quest for 
Collaborative ‘aesthetic sociability’ 
Kirsty Bunting offers an analysis of the shared life writing of Vernon Lee and Clementina 
Anstruther-Thomson, with particular reference to the writing of ‘Beauty and Ugliness’. The 
essay investigates how the authors’ already precarious subjectivities as women working in the 
male-dominated scientific and aesthetic fields of the 1890s were brought under further stress 
by Lee’s compulsive need for increased strength through union with another, her scepticism 
about her own abilities as ‘motor-type’ aesthete, and the collaborators’ unequal investigative 
and textual methodology. By analysing Lee’s semi-autobiographical depictions of her work 
with Anstruther-Thomson in Althea and focusing in particular on the pair’s one successful 
experiment in the search for ‘aesthetic sociability’ in front of Titian’s ‘Sacred and Profane 
Love’, this essay charts the development of their shared lives and writing from their first 
meeting, to the ecstatic pinnacle of their joint achievement, before examining the collapse of 
their collaborative dyad.  
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Vernon Lee (the pseudonym of Violet Paget, 1856–1935) and Clementina Anstruther-
Thomson’s (1857–1921) co-authored essay ‘Beauty and Ugliness’ first appeared in the 
Contemporary Review in autumn 1897.1 It expounded the theory that for a rare breed of 
people especially sensitive to visual stimuli (especially works of art), whom they called 
‘motor-types’, the body undergoes a series of involuntary physical and mental responses such 
as ‘alteration in our respiratory and equilibratory processes, and [...] initiated movements of 
various parts of the body’ when concentrating the gaze on an object or scene (p. 236). Lee 
and Anstruther-Thomson describe their practice of ‘anthropomorphic aesthetics’ as at once a 
‘projection of our inner experience into the forms which we see’ and a means to ‘make form 
exist in ourselves’ (p. 236). The result is ‘aesthetic sociability’ or ‘feelings of vivid 
fellowship’ with the observed object and with one another.2 The physical, emotional and 
intellectual sensations that accompany this art empathy, the collaborators explained, can 
prove pleasant, unpleasant or indifferent, and this response determines aesthetic appreciation 
 or revulsion. Thus, they contributed to the burgeoning late-nineteenth-century embodied 
approach to the study of the beautiful.  
Lee and Anstruther-Thomson were unusual in their art response in that they sought to 
experience simultaneous and identical anthropomorphizing bodily and emotional affects in 
harmonious accord together. By positing the art object as a point of triangulated interchange 
between them, they not only attempted to understand the art object’s formal qualities in 
bodily terms, they also tried to achieve a closer knowledge of, and identification with, each 
other through the shared act of looking. The published and unpublished records of their 
gallery experiments are not merely descriptions of the objects under observation but manifest 
intimate portraits of the critics’ bodies and feelings, making them curious examples of shared 
life writings. They not only record the pair’s professional endeavours and day-to-day private 
lives, but also detail the minutiae of their sensory, nervous, postural, respiratory, empathetic 
and, some critics have argued, erotic, experiences. In their attempts to achieve new modes of 
being, sharing and communicating, they succeeded in innovating new models of 
physiological and psychological interiority. Reading ‘Beauty and Ugliness’, and their other 
works, as shared life writing highlights the ways in which the pair were modern pioneers 
exploring new subjectivities in gender and genre at the end of the nineteenth century. Hilary 
Fraser sums up their art criticism as ‘mak[ing] room for multiple versions of spectatorship, 
and so empower[ing] women’s looking’, but, Fraser states, ‘their insistence on the 
significance of difference in aesthetic perception is nowhere explicitly identified as sexed or 
gendered in their formal writing on psychological aesthetics’.3 This essay follows on from 
Fraser’s summation but argues that their collaborative methodology, the ways in which they 
divided their labour and valued the other’s contributions, could be described as ‘gendered’ in 
that it conforms to a traditional gendered economy of creativity and exchange, positing Lee 
as male-identified, cerebral, literary, masterful and professional. Anstruther-Thomson, on the 
 other hand, is associated with the passive, receptive body, the spoken, the impulsive and the 
amateur, the ancillary or helpmeet to the dominant Lee. This essay will examine how their 
shared writing exposes this inequity and how it brought an end to their collaboration. 
 Although the collaborators published ‘Beauty and Ugliness’ under both their names, 
their collaborative methodology and aesthetic theory was driven by a desire to think, feel and 
write as one, to obliterate the physical and mental barriers between them (and the art work). 
This resulted in a desire to present themselves as bound in as seamless an aesthetic and 
textual union as their contemporaries Katherine Bradley and Edith Cooper had in the 
cultivation of their shared literary identity, ‘Michael Field’. This essay will examine the ways 
in which Lee and Anstruther-Thomson attempted this, and their only partial success. The 
authors of ‘Beauty and Ugliness’ attracted more attention from critics and a wider readership 
than ‘Michael Field’, but unlike Bradley and Cooper their joint collaborative personae, as 
well as their relationship as lovers, was undermined by the fact that the desire for creative and 
aesthetic union which characterized their physiological aesthetics was driven largely by one 
of its members only: Vernon Lee. This essay also explores how Lee’s compulsion to achieve 
the heightened fellowship and closeness offered by their principle of ‘aesthetic sociability’ 
(even when she was secretly sceptical about the existence of true ‘motor type’ responsiveness 
within herself, as this essay explains) saw the collaborators strive, thrive and then fail in their 
shared work. As Linda H. Peterson has written in her study of the public and private shared 
life writing of the Howitt family: 
[C]ollaborative life writing demands that its subjects share ideology in order to share 
narrative. When ideological positions converge, life writing becomes possible. When they 
diverge the collaborative narrative breaks down, reaches an impasse or disperses into 
individual life stories.4 
 This essay examines Lee and Anstruther-Thomson’s ideological convergence as they 
approached the height of their collaborative achievement: the writing of ‘Beauty and 
Ugliness’. I state that the writing of ‘Beauty and Ugliness’ (as opposed to its publication) is 
their high water mark, both as aesthetic co-investigators and as lovers, because as the essay 
appeared in print the pair were accused, somewhat unjustly, of plagiarizing their friend 
Bernard Berenson’s work. Horrified, Anstruther-Thomson immediately withdrew from their 
shared work in aesthetics.5 It is at this moment that their joint lives, work and aesthetic 
ideology began to diverge and disperse into the ‘individual life stories’ of Peterson’s model.  
This essay, whilst not centring upon Lee or Anstruther-Thomson’s subjectivities as 
late-nineteenth-century lesbians (already fairly comprehensively discussed elsewhere), begins 
by charting the development of their shared lives and writings to its zenith with ‘Beauty and 
Ugliness’ (and in particular their experiments with Titian’s ‘Sacred and Profane Love’, 
documented therein), and ends with the demise of their collaboration.6 At the heart of this 
essay is the assertion that the pair’s already precarious subjectivities as women working in the 
male-dominated scientific and aesthetic establishments were brought under further stress 
from within by Lee’s compulsive need for increased strength through union with another, 
driven by her awareness of this social and intellectual isolation from these communities of 
professional men. Her need to be taken seriously resulted in Lee assuming the hopelessly 
dichotomized position of at once relying upon Anstruther-Thomson (as convincing ‘motor-
type’) to provide the evidence they required for their aesthetic experiments, and being 
embarrassed by what would be received as their amateurish and insufficiently substantiated 
semi-scientific methods. This fracture in the foundations of their shared lives and writings 
was evident even in the earliest days of their relationship. 
Their relationship spanned 34 years following their initial meeting in the summer of 
1887 and their correspondence (now held in the archives of Colby College, Maine and 
 Somerville College, Oxford) attests that they fell in love that first summer.7 Any vestiges of 
this romantic attachment ended dramatically as ‘Beauty and Ugliness’ appeared in print. 
Most scholarship cites ‘Beauty and Ugliness’ as their first and only collaborative work. Yet, 
in 1889 they collaboratively produced ‘Old Italian Gardens’, a Genus loci essay combining 
Lee’s observations on Italian landscapes with Anstruther-Thomson’s sketches. Lee’s 
unpublished manuscript ‘Statement Concerning the Writing of Beauty and Ugliness’8 
describes another little-known collaborative work. She writes, ‘[I]n the autumn [of 1892] we 
went to Bergamo and Venice. At Bergamo Miss A.T. made a number of notes on Lotto which 
were incorporated textually into my paper on Venetian and Lombard Villas which appeared 
in Cosmopolis.’9 This refers to ‘Old Lombard and Venetian Villas’, which remained 
unpublished until April 1896. Its reader is aware of the presence of a travelling companion 
accompanying Lee throughout her walk around famous Italian villas, lakes and gardens, 
because the essay is narrated in the plural first person pronoun, but it is unclear who this other 
person is until the essay’s end. Lee’s claim that Anstruther-Thomson’s observations were 
‘incorporated textually’ into the essay is evinced further when the identity of her companion 
is finally revealed in the essay’s penultimate paragraph, which begins, ‘“Look at this 
composition,” says my friend K___, taking me up to the enormous altarpiece at San 
Bartolomeo.’10 The text continues for some 20 lines with Anstruther-Thomson’s idiosyncratic 
art-criticism of a Lorenzo Lotto ‘Madonna and Child with Saints’. 
‘Old Lombard and Venetian Villas’ deserves to be revisited here as an early work of 
shared life writing, conveying as it does the exuberance and excitement of the collaborators’ 
early travels and research. The telling moment in which Anstruther-Thomson is pictured 
interrupting the text with her demand that Lee turn her gaze towards her and the altarpiece 
captures the way in which her commanding and assured art-responsiveness impressed and 
 vivified Lee and her work. Lee would later say that Anstruther-Thomson had converted her to 
physiological aesthetics in these early days of their relationship: 
It was only as a result of intimacy with Kit Anstruther-Thomson that I became aware 
that, much as I had written about works of art, I did not really know them when they 
were in front of me: did not know a copy from a masterpiece. I did not know what I 
liked or disliked; still less why I did either.11 
Despite this acknowledgement of her collaborator as an enlightening, guiding presence in 
their shared work, ‘Old Lombard and Venetian Villas’ highlights the ways in which Lee was 
careful to frame Anstruther-Thomson’s unapologetic, dynamic and performative aesthetics. 
She contains her partner’s ‘notes’ as a short, clearly delineated interlude in her work. Perhaps 
it is unsurprising, then, that the essay was published as Lee’s lone writing, Anstruther-
Thomson’s involvement marginalized to that of a near-silent onlooker and companion. Here 
were the early signs of Lee’s fear of not being accepted as the intellectual equal of her male 
contemporaries in psychological aesthetics, and of her awareness that, by following 
Anstruther-Thomson into the introspective and isolating sphere of empathy and sensory 
impressions, they risked shutting themselves off from a larger scientific community. This 
resulted in a tendency on Lee’s part to pre-emptively emphasize her own intellectual 
capabilities whilst, ostensibly unintentionally, reducing Anstruther-Thomson’s involvement 
in their work to performative bodily responsiveness. Despite this imbalance, Lee remained 
committed to her assertion that aesthetic experience was ‘heightened by sharing’ the 
‘enjoyment of beautiful things’ with another person.12 Lee stated that, ‘the feeling of one 
individual is strengthened by the expression of similar feeling in his neighbour [...] and that 
two efforts, like two horses starting a carriage instead of one, combined give more than 
double the value of each taken separately’.13 In attempting to achieve aesthetic sociability and 
produce jointly written expressions of shared aesthetic experience, Lee and Anstruther-
 Thomson were working against the current of introspective art criticism and the new field of 
scientific psychological aesthetics. The key psychological aesthete commentators of the age, 
including, amongst others, George Henry Lewes, Bernard Berenson, William James, Karl 
Groose, Grant Allen and Theodore Lipps, talk of lone, not shared, aesthetic experience or 
connoisseurship. 
However, just like these, notably all male, investigators in the field, the central 
concern of Lee and Anstruther-Thomson’s research was answering the question ‘What is the 
process of perceiving form, and what portions of our organism participate therein?’ (p. 161). 
Their approach was inspired, in part, by Walter Pater’s The Renaissance: Studies in Art and 
Poetry (1873) which suggested the art-critic make him- or herself the subject of analysis by 
asking, ‘What is this song or picture, this engaging personality presented in life or in a book 
to me? What effect does it really produce on me?’14 William James’s Principles of 
Psychology (1890) and its assertion that all emotion is nothing other than physical response to 
given stimuli also influenced their approach. James argued that these ‘bodily changes’ 
operate by ‘a preorganized mechanism’ and are so ‘infinitely numerous and subtle that the 
entire organism may be called a sounding board, which every change of consciousness, 
however slight, may make reverberate’.15 James conceded, ‘there is no real evidence [...] for 
the assumption that particular perceptions do produce wide-spread bodily effects’.16 The 
‘Beauty and Ugliness’ experiments were conceived as a way of providing this missing 
evidence, but Lee and Anstruther-Thomson’s quest for shared aesthetic sociability and 
triangulated merger with the art work and one another developed as a curious offshoot of the 
late-nineteenth-century shift in aesthetics from a Ruskinian model of utility to a Paterian 
quest for pleasure, during which aestheticians became less likely to seek moral or spiritual 
succour in art and the beautiful or to theorize ways of employing appreciation of beauty for 
the good of all society, tending instead to ask nothing more of the artwork than pleasurable 
 impressions. This shift resulted in the privatization of aesthetic experience. The aesthetic 
condition, Pater argued, is one of solitude:  
Experience, already reduced to a group of impressions, is ringed round for each one of 
us by that thick wall of personality through which no real voice has ever pierced on its 
way to us [...]. Every one of these impressions is the impression of the individual in 
his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world.17  
Bernard Berenson, like Pater, believed that aesthetic connoisseurs were consoled in their 
isolation by the possibility of achieving the ‘aesthetic moment’ of ‘mystic vision’ in which 
the art object and observer ‘become one entity; time and space are abolished and the spectator 
is possessed by one awareness’.18  
       Both Lee and Anstruther-Thomson believed that this ‘mystic’ experience could be 
expanded to incorporate two beholders of the same object in ‘one awareness’. However, it 
was Vernon Lee who was the driving force behind the pair’s quest for aesthetic sociability as 
a means of overcoming aesthetic, as well as personal and professional, isolation, and there are 
numerous contemporaneous accounts by their friends to support this. For instance, Irene 
Cooper Willis, Lee’s friend and literary executor, offered this insight: 
She raged at ‘having no influence’, that being demonstrated, she declared, by the 
commercial failure of her books. She attributed her lack of influence to her isolated 
social position, often describing herself as an alien, having no ties of either nation, 
blood, class or profession. She was just an individual, she said, and to be an individual 
was a weak status that deprived her of her power as a writer.19 
A 1914 letter to Lee from her (by then estranged) friend Augustine Bulteau echoes Cooper 
Willis and suggests that even in her later years Lee had failed to overcome this alienation: 
I know that you are a waif, a stray, that nothing very lasting, no regular family or 
friend, binds you to your country. I know that the English refuse to grant any 
 importance to your adaptation of ideas picked up in Germany. I know that the ‘thinker’ 
that you regard yourself, is the cause of much laughter among your countrymen.20  
Bulteau’s cruel admonition refers to Lee’s anti-war stance and her association with the 
German science establishment, a position Bulteau considered disloyal to Britain and the 
allied countries, but the idea of Lee as an intellectual outcast must have hit home.  
The collaborators may have been attracted to the Paterian privileging of aesthetic 
feeling over knowledge, as well as to William James’s embodied model of life as primarily 
physical feeling, because it allowed them to confer authority upon themselves in the teeth of a 
culture of university-educated experts and their professional, institutional affiliations which 
may otherwise deny them authority to profess a working knowledge of science, psychology 
or architecture. This is evinced in ‘Beauty and Ugliness’, for example, which anticipates 
criticism over their passages on the appreciation of architecture by stating: 
we desire to warn the reader against the criticism which explains the aesthetic 
qualities of architecture by a reference to the technicalities of building. This view 
cannot possibly be true, because we take the greatest aesthetic pleasure in architecture 
without any knowledge of building and because our impressions are often at variance 
with what a knowledge of building would reveal. (p. 195) 
This defensiveness is also seen in Lee’s semi-autobiographical Baldwin: A Book of 
Dialogues (1886). Lee writes herself into this text as the philosopher Baldwin, described as ‘a 
not very feminine man’ placed to ‘some measure at a woman’s standpoint’ by the 
‘exceptional solitude’ of his upbringing and education.21 Baldwin is also recognized as a 
double for Lee by her biographers Christa Zorn and Vineta Colby.22 Baldwin’s introduction 
provides details of the title character’s life which correlate startlingly with Lee’s own.23 
Baldwin, according to Lee, represents ‘a borderland between fact and fancy’, allowing Lee 
the freedom of self-definition by which she chooses to inhabit the body of a ‘masculine’ male 
 sensitive to female experience: the perfect guise in which to make love to the young Scottish 
aristocrat Lady Althea, who doubles for Anstruther-Thomson, when he reappears in Althea: A 
Second Book of Dialogues on Aspirations and Duties (1894), a book dedicated ‘To C.A.T’. 
Colby attributes all of the characters in Althea with living doubles from the collaborators’ 
circle of acquaintances.24 In Althea, Baldwin/Lee laments the ‘perfect agony’ of his 
isolation,25 stating: 
I am getting to believe more and more [...] that despite all friendships and all loves, 
we must rest content to live alone with our own soul [...]. [O]ur veritable intellectual 
and moral life, like our veritable physical life, takes place in isolation. Sympathy may 
help, love may help, but what we actually feel and think and do, we feel and think and 
do alone. There is a point beyond which no soul can come within sight of ours – an 
inner sanctuary where we are alone with ourselves [...]. [N]ext to the fact of death, 
there is none so full of awe, I think, as that of such inevitable isolation.26 
Lady Althea, however, does not share this Paterian view, believing that it is possible to 
transcend ego boundaries simply by loving someone and sharing their life interests. Baldwin 
imagines that union with another must result in the violent destruction of both parties, stating 
that the penetration of another’s ‘inner sanctuary’ would be ‘the destruction of oneself’.27 He 
continues, ‘you might as well bleed yourself into your friend’s veins; you and he would die, 
and your lives would have been none the less separate in those last moments. There is 
something solemn and sad in this knowledge. [...] [I]n reality, we can never be fully united’.28 
The 28-year-old Lee had recorded similar anxieties in an unpublished diary many years 
before this: 
The world is overstocked with mixed natures, and one of the great wearinesses, one of 
the great pains of spiritual life, is the perception that we can never rest satisfied with 
any individual [...], that we cannot give up our soul to absolute reverence, love, 
 satisfaction. Hence the poignant desire to obtain from art what we cannot obtain from 
reality, to create beings whom we can understand without criticising, without sorting 
good from evil; to create friends whom we can love completely.29  
This diary confession, the semi-autobiographical Althea and Baldwin, as well as 
contemporaneous accounts by the pair’s friends all lend weight to the assertion that Lee’s 
anxiety for closer communion with another insinuated itself into every aspect of the 
collaborator’s work and that their co-authored writing crosses over into revelatory and 
intimate life-writing, recording their repeated attempts at finding a solution to the 
impossibility of annihilation of bodily and emotional boundaries.  
Lee’s dread of isolation was compounded by an anxious secret that, at the time of 
writing ‘Beauty and Ugliness’, she was trying to suppress even from herself, and which she 
did not reveal to Anstruther-Thomson until their relationship’s breakdown in 1897. ‘Beauty 
and Ugliness’ claims that both collaborators were examples of the ‘motor-type’, ‘specially 
developed persons’ with ‘highly aesthetic natures’; but inwardly Lee knew she was not one of 
them (p. 160). Lee’s inability to experience kinaesthetic sensation, as well as the 
psychological impact of keeping this secret, contributed to the crisis which accompanied the 
writing of their essay since it meant Lee was isolated from her own experiments, aesthetic 
theories and, crucially, from Anstruther-Thomson. Years after ‘Beauty and Ugliness’, Lee 
would publicly refute her claims to motor-type responsiveness, confessing that throughout the 
gallery experiments, ‘I was indeed […] quite unable to join in.’30 In fact, of the 20 or so 
experiments documented in ‘Beauty and Ugliness’, only one, conducted before Titian’s 
‘Sacred and Profane Love’, resulted in the sought after moment of aesthetic sociability. It is 
to their experiences before this artwork and the collaborators’ momentary ecstatic merger of 
body with canvas, emotion with text, that this essay now turns.  
 Their analysis of this painting demonstrates that they overlooked its historical, 
allegorical or literary significance, preferring instead a strategy of identification, naming the 
subjects, not ‘Venus and the Bride’ or ‘Sacred and Profane Love’, but simply ‘the two 
women’. The experiment, therefore, begins in a model of reflection and recognition 
reminiscent of a mirror (a model that entirely excludes Titian himself). The collaborators 
could be said to be reconstructing the painting’s contents and meaning, creating a visual 
economy which celebrates female love and looking, driven by their desire to diffuse their 
isolating bodily and emotional boundaries. At the end of their experimental gazing at this 
painting together, the collaborators record that it has the effect of, ‘exciting us [...],widening 
our breathing, of making us feel light-hearted, and of making us feel enclosed’ in a loving 
dyad which mirrors the canvas’s merger of the female bodies with Cupid’s (p. 232). The 
following describes this experiment. 
  Good painting, the collaborators tell us, must demonstrate accomplished ‘realisation’ 
of the ‘third dimension’ (i.e. a skilful rendering of depth of field), creating the sense of a 
three-dimensional space which beckons the beholder in. They exclaim, ‘[t]he ground lies flat, 
and will bear our weight right through the picture into the distance’ (p. 232). The effect of 
perceiving this other, seemingly accessible, world results in a connection which passes 
‘backwards and forwards with the beholder, so that we enter into the picture’ (p. 232). This 
they describe as a split sense of ‘being alive, one might almost say, on both sides, instead of 
only in front’ of the canvas (p. 233). Perhaps these first hints that the pair were feeling 
themselves drawn into the art work come as no surprise given the idiom in which Titian 
worked. It is a painting that employs typical Renaissance principles of triangulated 
composition (most common in devotional art) as a means to interrogate, implicate or involve 
the viewer. Yet their sense of incorporation develops as they note the ocular motor 
adjustments they experience as they gaze, not at the work in its entirety, but by tracing its 
 outlines in a continuous visual flow over what they call its ‘ideal lines’. Great art, they claim, 
possesses a fluidity of ‘ideal lines’ which the eye can satisfactorily follow without 
interruption. The cohesion or unification of subjects or patterns within an artwork by these 
lines is what they call ‘tie’, and the ocular motor adjustments triggered by good tie are 
pleasurable (p. 229). However, if the ideal lines are ‘vague’ or ‘haphazard’ the eye cannot 
follow them, form cannot be perceived effectively, tie is not achieved, and the motor 
adjustments which accompany this disrupted gaze are unpleasant and the object cannot be 
enjoyed (pp. 228–29). They write, ‘in looking at it, we unconsciously mime the subtly 
coordinating complexity of movement’ of the painting’s outlines (p. 234). They claim to be 
under the painting’s controlling influence, denying they have any power over their bodies’ 
ekphrastic translation of it. 
Their physical translation of the ideal lines of the Titian are most clearly expressed by 
what Anstruther-Thomson’s calls her ‘skeleton’ sketch, which accompanied their essay [see 
Figure]. The lines of the sketch can be followed by the reader as they explain that the gaze 
follows a distorted circle that begins at the pointed toe of the seated bride figure and moves 
up her body to where the folds of her sleeves draw the gazers’ eyes across her body to the 
right of the painting, where the line is taken up by the outstretched arm of the naked female 
figure. This line passes up over her head and across the head of Cupid in the painting’s 
centre, returning again to caress the bride’s head and travelling back down to her foot, where 
the circuit begins again, the gaze circulating between and around the two women’s bodies. 
This enclosing line creates the impression that, ‘the two women [...] are not detached 
individuals, but combine with the little cupid in the middle to form a whole’ (p. 233). 
Following these lines results in the sensation that, ‘[a]ll the time we look at the picture our 
balance is swung from left to right, and, after a pause, back from right to left’ (p. 234). 
Therefore, their motor and empathetic responses to the work have the effect of suggesting 
 another circle which binds Lee and Anstruther-Thomson, and they experience shared and 
vitalizing, pleasurable motor effects during this enclosure together. At last, they are able to 
write, ‘we, in beholding it, are not only made happy, but enclosed, forbidden to escape or 
lapse, and forced to move through every detail of a mood of happiness’ (p. 235). Their final 
word on the Titian experiment, and indeed the final passages of ‘Beauty and Ugliness’, 
presents an image of the collaborators bound in ecstatic merger, in which ‘[l]ife outside 
seems obliterated, and the moment of consummate self-sufficing feeling to have come, and, 
as in the case of Faust, to be fixed’ (p. 235). This notion of fixedness within the ecstatic 
moment of union was a very real concern for the collaborators. It could be argued that they 
came to adopt this painting as the symbol of their aesthetic and private bonds. Firstly, they 
returned to Rome to see the painting ‘several times every year’ (p. 233). Furthermore, they 
extended their one successful experience of aesthetic sociability through their possession of a 
charcoal sketch of Anstruther-Thomson in the dress and posture of Titian’s bride figure 
(made by their friend John Singer Sargent), which Lee included in Art and Man in 1924. 
Thus, these actions underline and draw public attention to the private bond forged before this 
artwork, whilst prolonging and disseminating the memory of the moment of their shared art-
union and emphasizing how closely their lives, their shared writing and their aesthetics had 
once come.  
  Years after ‘Beauty and Ugliness’, Lee described their elation in that autumn of 1897, 
saying, ‘Like, no doubt, many over-hasty discoverers we believed ourselves to have found 
one of the Keys to the Universe, a key which would instantly turn in the lock and reveal all 
the mysteries of art-psychology to every observer.’31 Lee recorded that both collaborators 
retired to Il Palmerino (Lee’s Italian home), for the purpose of ‘working Kit’s notes into a 
logical sequence and providing them with their psychological setting’.32 However, Lee felt 
that this task was made difficult for her collaborator, whom she claimed ‘had least the habit 
 of literary expression and composition’.33 Irene Cooper Willis, who was often with the 
collaborators in Italy during this period, stated that to overcome this, ‘Lee did all the writing 
but Kit was called upon to listen to and approve of every written statements [sic] concerning 
the “experiments” and the conclusions drawn from this process.’34 Again, Lee’s anxiety is 
seen to surface in her description of her main concern during this time being, ‘rendering our 
new-fangled notions less startling by an array of already accepted psychological facts and 
theories’.35 Looking back at this time, Lee wrote: 
Kit may have felt as if her very personal and living impressions were being deadened 
under what perhaps struck her as philosophical padding [...]. I still sometimes catch 
myself feeling as if such manipulation of them came between me and my real self.36  
Lee’s ‘real self’, therefore, wanted to allow Anstruther-Thomson free reign to explore and 
communicate her ekphrastic responses, but her fear of being rejected by her peers could not 
allow it.  
Despite Lee’s best efforts to disguise any amateurish pretensions and methodological 
eccentricities, and the collaborators’ initial belief that they had ‘found one of the keys to the 
universe’, their discoveries were greeted with indifference or contempt by their peers.37 
Theodore Lipps, for example, responded to their essay with ‘particularly scathing criticism’.38 
Berenson’s plagiary accusation was never made public but was common knowledge amongst 
their friends. Lee described their ‘disappointment’ as ‘the chilly drop from one’s own warm 
excitement over a cherished piece of work into the indifference of other folk’.39 The 
disappointment prevented Anstruther-Thomson from returning to psychological aesthetics; 
their collaboration was all but over.  
The journey of ‘Beauty and Ugliness’ as a work of life writing that documents their 
public and private relationship takes a final, gloomier turn in 1912 when Lee republished it 
alongside their other jointly-written works in the co-signed collection ‘Beauty and Ugliness’ 
 and Other Studies in Psychological Aesthetics. In this new version, Lee undid their 
collaborative cover by splitting their essay into attributed sections framed with brackets 
initialled ‘C.A.T’, revealing that Anstruther-Thomson’s portions are a series of passages 
describing her physiological motor responses. In the footnotes to this version, Lee finally 
communicated her startling volte-face upon her 1897 claims to motor-type abilities, stating, ‘I 
no longer consider such sensations as explaining or even necessarily accompanying the 
activity of form perception.’40 This statement, alongside the attributive apportioning of the 
essay’s labour, leaves Anstruther-Thomson to bear the brunt of the negative reception (which, 
in actuality, had long since faded, their work on the essay by 1912 largely forgotten) of their, 
once-shared, theories of motor-response. In making these changes to their essay, Lee makes 
the distinction between the performative, responsive body of her collaborator and her own 
cerebral, learned theorizing. That Lee felt embarrassed by Anstruther-Thomson’s non-
scientific, conjectural and ambiguous language is illustrated in her attempts to restrain this 
rambling style by persisting on enclosing it within her own measured, academic explanations 
of the experiments, enforcing the distinction between the performative, responsive body of 
her collaborator and her own rational theorizing.  
Let us return now to Lee’s semi-autobiographical Althea of 1894 (in which Lee 
appears as the male character, Baldwin) in order to further mine the ways in which Lee’s 
intellectual insecurity and the pair’s unequal division of labour could be said to have first 
become formalized. Lee’s introduction to this work celebrates Lady Althea (Anstruther-
Thomson) as an exceptional talent in the field of aesthetic introspection: 
I have taken as the central figure in these dialogues one of those rare natures so 
strangely balanced that they recognise truth as soon as they see it […], natures which 
know spontaneously what the rest of us learn by experience and reflection; fortunate 
samples of what we may perhaps all become.41  
 This spontaneity, Althea’s curious way of knowing, or half-knowing, what others must 
struggle to know, comes as the result of her affinity with the natural world. All of Althea’s 
pronouncements upon Baldwin’s theories are accompanied by her lazily fingering olive 
branches, gazing upon sunsets and swaying grasses, or making daisy chains, suggesting her 
thought processes are translations of the beautiful and natural, and that they are unconscious 
and innately physical as opposed to educated and empirical like Baldwin’s. As Lee was 
writing Althea in the early 1890s, ‘Beauty and Ugliness’ was already under development. It is 
possible to read Baldwin’s denial of Althea’s intellection and her need of a master aesthete to 
help her fully understand her talents as being prescient of the tensions raised by their 
collaborative methodology, Lee’s secret of non-motor responsiveness and their subsequent 
estrangement. The description continues, ‘Althea is naturally the pupil of Baldwin; for being 
all she is by the mere grace of God, she is, at first inarticulate, unreasoning, ignorant of all 
why and wherefore, and requires to be taught many things which others know.’42 In 
Baldwin’s presence Althea is led to a perfect understanding of her own vague, half-
recognized notions. She states, for instance, ‘I understand […]. Do you know I have thought 
something like that myself, only I wasn’t sure whether it mightn’t be some of that usual 
wrong-headedness of mine.’43 Baldwin, on the other hand, in a somewhat narcissistic visual 
economy, is most aware of his own brilliance and vitality, as well as Althea’s beauty, when 
he sees his own greatness reflected in her. Immediately following the above instance of 
Althea’s enlightenment, ‘Baldwin thought, or rather felt, how singularly positive was the 
healthfulness, the largeness, and beauty of the soul lodged in this [Althea’s] large, fair, 
youthful body’.44 In ‘Beauty and Ugliness’ the collaborators would develop this sense of the 
body being at its most healthful when in the aesthetic moment of physically exhilarating 
translation of the beautiful, operating at its optimum level when perfected by merger with the 
artwork. Yet, in Althea the body’s ideal state comes as the result of a combination of Althea’s 
 beauty and naturalness with Baldwin’s insight and intellect: the perfect balance of beauty 
with brains, instinct with learning, the very embodiment of pedagogic eros, which, when Lee 
and Anstruther-Thomson’s life writing and relationship are taken in the long view, might be a 
fitting way to describe their bond. Although Althea speaks of an unequal dynamic, Baldwin’s 
final product (a philosophy for a model society) cannot be arrived at without shared input.  
A similar reciprocal collaborative model was adopted in the writing of ‘Beauty and 
Ugliness’, about which, Lee reminisced, ‘more and more each of us brought something which 
could not have been got by the other’ as Anstruther-Thomson divulged the secrets of physical 
aesthetic pleasure or revulsion and Lee translated or explained this physical phenomena, both 
to her collaborator and to their readership.45 This is most clearly seen in Lee’s statement: 
I put aside all historical, philosophical and ‘critical’ studies of art, and fell to reading 
every psychological book and periodical which came within reach [...]. Thus, while in 
galleries and museums Kit was filling book after book (usually humble account books 
with ready reckoners and the year’s almanack [sic] attached) with half-legible pencil 
jottings, I was wading through mental science, including the physiology of the sense 
organs, and specialist’s treatises like Stumpf’s huge volumes on tone-perception [...]. 
The result of my readings was, however, that when Kit came home after a morning in 
the galleries, saying with ill-repressed excitement: ‘Do you know, I think I’ve found 
out something, after all’, I was often able to tell her that she had really done so, and 
even the other things which she must set about discovering. I became, moreover, more 
and more able to fill up gaps in her notions or set her to filling them up.46  
In maintaining this skewed collaborative dynamic throughout their lives together they 
initiated the process by which Anstruther-Thomson’s contribution to the collaboration 
became erased. Critics would came to align her with an ideal of the passive, receptive and 
mysterious body, merely the subject of scientific experiment whilst Lee presented herself as, 
 and so has come to be associated with, the active intellection which governed the experiments 
themselves. And yet, ‘Beauty and Ugliness’ still demonstrates that for at least one brief 
moment the collaborators did succeed in obliterating the boundaries between them and 
between the worlds of reality and fantasy, canvas and flesh, and in so doing they challenged 
Pater’s assertion, and Lee’s fear, that each individual must exist as solitary prisoner within 
their own isolated world of sensation and perception. 
Around 1915 or 1916 the two participated in a meeting at the ‘Chelsea Union of 
Democratic Control’. Anstruther-Thomson was the chairperson whilst Lee presented her anti-
war text Satan the Waster. Lee called this ‘Kit’s and my last act of collaboration, perhaps the 
consummation of our original perfect understanding in all the fundamental matters of life’.47 
Perhaps they had come to this more hopeful stage in their relationship due to Lee’s arrival in 
1909 at a new way of thinking about aesthetic union, at the time of writing Laurus Nobilis. 
Having mourned that aesthetic sociability and loving union were unattainable, and called the 
desire for merger ‘a great delusion [...] which some insist upon carrying down to their graves, 
bruising themselves against the impregnable boundaries of another’, and having accepted her 
non-motor responsiveness,48 Lee came to accept that complete transcendence of the 
boundaries between herself and her collaborators was impossible. She states:  
Final fulfilment of that dream of absolute union? No; but once more that passing 
semblance thereof, through which, as the central moment of all great loves, we have 
all of us lived [...]. We have seen that by one of the most gracious coincidences 
between beauty and kindliness, the aesthetic emotion is even intensified by the 
knowledge of co-existence in others: the delight in each person communicating itself, 
like a musical third, fifth, or octave, to the similar yet different delight in his 
neighbour, harmonic enriching harmonic by stimulating fresh vibration.49  
 Does this suggest Lee finally arrived at a more realistic and workable solution to her deep-
seated sense of social, intellectual and emotional isolation from her peers and collaborators 
by finally accepting that harmony can be achieved by accepting the other’s ‘other-ness’? If 
indeed Laurus Nobilis does suggest she came to terms with, and was satisfied by, accepting 
the experience of others as ‘similar yet different’ to her own, this new formulation of shared 
sociability came too late to allow a resumption of her collaborative endeavours with 
Anstruther-Thomson in any significant way. The pair remained friends until Anstruther-
Thomson’s death, yet they never lived or travelled together as they had done before ‘Beauty 
and Ugliness’. The inequality of their collaborative methodology, Lee’s reductive idealization 
of her collaborator in Platonizing terms as her neophyte in a model which recreated a Socratic 
bond (as expressed in Althea), as well as Lee’s scepticism over Anstruther-Thomson’s claims 
to motor-type responsiveness, all heralded the collaborative crisis from which they would 
never fully recover and which ensured that Anstruther-Thomson’s contribution to British 
aestheticism would remain overlooked for nearly a century. However, one short-lived 
moment in their work gives a glimpse of the possibilities for collaborative life writing. Lee 
and Anstruther-Thomson’s tenacious quest for (and, albeit brief, ecstatic achievement of) 
shared ‘aesthetic sociability’ demonstrates the potential fluidity and permeability of authorial 
and creative subjectivity and how Vernon Lee and Anstruther-Thomson pioneered new, 
experimental ways of writing feeling together. 
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